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Chapter 6 – The radio war and a new 
performing right 
 
Two performing rights 
A fresh start 
In December 1931, in the midst of the Great Depression, the new 
United Australia Party, combining the Nationalist Party and Labor 
Party defectors, swept the Labor Government from office. Under Joe 
Lyons, the UAP attacked multiplying economic problems with the 
energy and will long sapped from its demoralised predecessor. John 
Latham, now also Deputy Prime Minister, returned to his old office of 
Attorney General in January 1932,1 and he reviewed afresh the old 
question of the performing right. He also began consulting with his 
colleague James Fenton, the Postmaster General, who was responsible 
for broadcasting policy. The two men soon discovered that they faced a 
host of difficulties, none of which their predecessors seemed in any way 
to have solved.  
Elected just before the Wall Street crash in 1929, the Labor 
Government battled unavailingly with the problems of deflation, 
unemployment and economic misery for over two years. In that time, 
the question of the performing right shrank in importance. Against the 
sepia and grey background of national life, the ardour for fighting over 
public performance fees cooled. With the start of UAP rule in 1932, the 
picture changed and the copyright scene again throbbed with energy. 
The Depression was far from over but the defeat of the Labor 
Government, irreversibly tainted by incumbency in a time of disaster, 
offered new prospects for business interests clamouring for any sign  
of hope.  
For those involved in copyright policy, the new mood promised a 
deliverance of sorts, enabling the Government and various interests 
groups to make a fresh assessment of long-standing problems. William 
Harrison Moore’s success in persuading the Berne Union to qualify 
                                                     
1 He was also Minister for External Affairs and Minister for Industry. 
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Article 11 bis at the Rome Conference pointed to the Government’s 
main preoccupation. For Latham and Fenton, broadcasting  
regulation mattered far more than complaints about licensing fees from 
local councils, cinema owners and the proprietors of entertainment 
venues. Both were determined to institute some sort of machinery to 
prevent APRA from wrecking the fragile economies of radio businesses 
still unable to turn profits. Both were also determined that APRA 
would not grab an undue portion of the listeners’ fees that subsidised 
the ABC.  
The radio ban 
At the same time, they were embroiled in debate over a matter 
unconnected with APRA, the so-called “radio ban”, the boycott against 
radio stations begun by record manufacturers in late 1931. The radio 
ban, instituted because record companies viewed radio as a commercial 
succubus, draining from listeners the vital desire to purchase records, 
created a new, unforeseen problem. It threatened to permanently cut 
the supply of new records to broadcasters and destroy the industry 
more swiftly and thoroughly than any action APRA was likely to take. 
In the end, it slowly petered out, its legitimacy questioned by 1933 
report of the Royal Commission on Performing Rights. But it created a 
lasting memento – the mechanical performing right, which the record 
companies first insisted on to justify the ban, and then continued to 
assert long after the ban ended. 
The radio ban, and the problem of thorny relations between one 
industry regulated by Latham’s department (gramophone) and another 
by Fenton’s department (broadcasting) were festering sores that 
Latham never fully salved. The record companies’ intransigence did not 
diminish during his term of office but the Attorney wasted not a 
second on the opinions of company executives. Considering himself, 
possibly correctly, the intellectual superior of everyone he met, he did 
not look for crumbs of mental comfort.  
Instead, he plunged boldly and assertively into the question of APRA’s 
relations with music users. If he regarded the claims of the recording 
industry with indifference, he approached the APRA question with 
obvious confidence. He knew the history of APRA’s conflicts and 
already had definite views about the appropriate policy for resolving 
disputes over the performing right. 
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Groping towards a solution 
In the early 1930s, APRA could look back on five years of success 
collecting performance fees. Revenues, derived mainly from payments 
received from the A Class radio stations, swelled its coffers. Though 
resenting its methods, few of its opponents denied the right of authors 
to receive payment for the public performance of music. Critics 
pointed out that APRA behaved like the monopolist it was, forcing the 
commercial users of music to pay exorbitant licence fees for playing 
music in public. APRA replied that, as a non-profit association acting 
for a large and diverse population of authors and publishers, its motives 
were not mercenary. 
To the new Government, APRA sometimes seemed like a troublesome 
predator, but one that not could be culled. Something, however, had to 
be done. In a half decade, APRA’s energy and combativeness stirred 
the anger of public organisations and buoyant new industries across 
Australia. For five years, they vented their displeasure on government 
officials. Politicians were perplexed, though by the time he first left 
office in 1929, Latham had formed a reasonably clear view of how to 
tackle the APRA question. 
The Government never doubted that the law permitted APRA to 
collect public performance fees. It evinced no interest in examining  
the merits of the performing right, or whether it properly extended  
to music broadcasts or music played in movies – questions asked  
by various of APRA’s opponents. On the other hand, Latham  
and his colleagues sympathised with commercial users who faced  
an unwelcome choice: pay whatever fees APRA demanded or stop 
playing music. 
Little by little, the politicians and bureaucrats groped their way to a 
solution. They started from the premise that public performances of 
music must be authorised and paid for. They also saw clearly that terms 
of licensing could not be left to the parties to determine. APRA, a 
virtual monopolist backed by the law, had too much negotiating power. 
Thus the problem they tried to solve was how to ameliorate the 
bargaining position of the commercial users of music. 
The Government’s hands were tied. Legislation and common law 
confirmed the right of copyright owners to demand fees for the public 
performance of music. Unless the Government attacked APRA on the 
grounds that authors must negotiate performance fees individually,  
not collectively through an agent like APRA, it could not force an end 
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to the APRA wars. Only by oblique means – Latham favoured 
compulsory arbitration – could it persuade the various parties to  
direct the energies wasted on conflict into constructive channels  
of negotiation.  
In 1932, developments in other common law countries were suggesting 
ways to resolve performing right disputes and policymakers now 
looked overseas for solutions. In 1928, Samuel Raymond, New 
Zealand’s delegate to the Rome Conference, proposed, in his report to 
the New Zealand Parliament, regulation through compulsory licensing 
and determination of royalties by a “competent authority”. In 1929, a 
Select Committee of the House of Commons, reviewing the Musical 
Copyright Bill, proposed that the Government legislate to provide for 
compulsory arbitration of licensing disputes. Then in 1931, Canada 
legislated to allow the Government to prescribe licence fees. 
Aware of overseas development and the complexities involved in 
achieving harmony in commercial relations between the suppliers and 
users of commercial music, the Government naturally trod carefully. It 
pragmatically decided to let an independent inquiry look thoroughly 
into all the issues and make recommendations for legislative reform.  
The Royal Commission on Performing Rights began hearings and 1932 
and the Royal Commissioner, Justice Owen, presented his findings in 
1933. He described the unregulated battleground of the performing 
rights, the cold resolution of the suppliers of commercial music, and 
the fear and disarray of commercial users. Marshalling their forces 
under the banners of the musical and mechanical performing rights, 
APRA and the gramophone companies intended to flatten their 
opponents if needs be.  
Owen contemplated with horror the prospect of a commercial scene 
littered with the corpses of their victims. He pinned his hopes on  
what he called the “sweet reasonableness” of the warring parties and 
proposed compulsory arbitration as a device to create peace  
between them. 
International developments – Britain and Canada 
Britain 
The unhappiness of music users at the activities of the Performing 
Right Society in Britain caused the British Government in 1929 to 
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introduce the Musical Copyright Bill, which introduced compulsory 
licensing of performing rights, and established a fixed maximum fee 
payable to the copyright owner. It also required the owner to print, on 
every copy of a work, a reservation of the performing right. 
The House of Commons referred the bill to a select committee which 
heard evidence from the Board of Trade, the Performing Right Society 
(England) and associations of music users. The committee’s Special 
Report summarised the complaints of music users. They said that the 
PRS did not publish lists of works it claimed to control, with the result 
that the user could not ascertain whether or not items of licensed music 
fell within the PRS’s claimed repertoire. Additionally, the society made 
arbitrary increases in licence fees and users had no means of protecting 
themselves against further increases or of ensuring any reasonable 
stability in charges. 
The special report noted that compulsory notice of reservation would 
be likely to conflict with Britain’s obligations under the Berne 
Convention and that the PRS had offered to circulate to licensees a 
complete list of all its publisher members. In the committee’s view, this 
offer “goes a considerable way to meet the complaints made.” The 
committee described the PRS as a “super-monopoly” controlling 90 
per cent or more of the performing rights in copyright music. 
Entertainment providers were “compelled” to pay the charges made by 
the Society. Music users were justified in their fear that the PRS would 
continue to demand higher and higher fees.  
For this reason, the report found, the Government should legislate to 
provide that if the society refused to grant licences on reasonable terms, 
music users were entitled to appeal “to arbitration or to some other 
tribunal” for relief. The select committee then reported the bill without 
amendment. The Government, however, chose not to proceed with the 
bill. It no doubt came under great pressure from the PRS, by then an 
extremely powerful force in British economic life, but the 
equivocations of bureaucrats proved the decisive factor.  
During the hearings, the PRS, the Board of Trade and the Foreign 
Office claimed that legislation restricting the performing rights of 
copyright owners could conflict with Britain’s treaty obligations under 
the Berne Convention. At the very least, said some witnesses, Britain 
might have to make a reservation or declaration in order to ratify the 
amending Rome Copyright Convention of 1928.  
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Placing weight on the evidence of government officials, the select 
committee recommended that the Board of Trade should frame a 
policy for adoption at the Brussels amending Conference scheduled for 
1935. That policy would allow Britain unequivocally to “deal with any 
abuse of monopoly rights such as that to which reference has been 
made”. Rather than proceed with a controversial measure, the 
Government decided to defer further legislative action until the next 
meeting of the Berne Union. 
Canada 
In Canada, the Government acted more boldly. The Canadian Copyright 
Amendment Act, assented to on 11 June 1931, required musical 
performing right societies to file with the Copyright Office lists of all 
works to which a society claimed title and a statement of all licence fees 
imposed by the society from time to time. A society could not collect 
licence fees or charges for any work that was not included in the list 
filed with the Copyright Office. 
The legislation provided that the Minister, after investigation and report 
by a Commissioner, could revise or otherwise prescribe licence fees, if 
satisfied that the society unduly withheld the grant of licences,  
collected excessive fees or otherwise acted in a manner detrimental to 
the public interest. Within months of the Act’s commencement, some 
Canadian broadcasting stations complained to the Minister about 
charges levied by the Canadian Performing Right Society. In 1932, he 
referred the complaint to a Commissioner, Mr Justice Ewing, for 
investigation and report. 
Record Manufacturers and the mechanical 
performing right 
The radio ban   
In the 1920s, the broadcasting industry stood out like a giant among the 
entities fighting APRA. In the 1930s, another colossus joined the 
battlefield of performing rights though not in opposition to APRA. 
This was the Australian record manufacturing industry, which in 1931 
declared commercial war on radio stations, banning them from 
purchasing and playing popular recordings.  
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The record manufacturers – the gramophone companies – attacked the 
radio stations because, they said, continuous broadcasting 
catastrophically undermined record sales. Asked by what right they 
could ban record sales, they made a radical claim much discussed 
during the proceedings of the Royal Commission on Performing 
Rights. They asserted that patent and copyright law conferred on them 
a performing right in records and insisted that broadcasters were  
liable to pay them public performance fees in addition to those paid  
to APRA. 
The Royal Commissioner declared that he was “by no means satisfied” 
that a performing right in records could be inferred from either patents 
or copyright law. His report expressed strong scepticism about the 
validity of the record companies’ claim and the merits of arguments 
advanced in support of the claim. The report alluded to the fact that 
Britain’s High Court was shortly to determine a claim for the 
mechanical performing right,2 but it noted that a common law ruling 
could not considered definitive. Only Parliament, by legislation, could 
call into existence the claimed right.  
Legislation did come, in Britain in 1956 and Australia in 1968. The 
common law presaged, or perhaps determined, the statutory law. In 
1934, the British High Court found that the copyright in a record 
included a right to control the public performance of the record. In the 
early 1930s, however, few would have predicted this result. When 
Latham again took the reins of copyright policy in 1932, the claim for a 
mechanical performing seemed nothing more than a bold gambit to 
bolster a destructive stratagem.  
For unquestionably, as became plain during the Royal Commission 
hearings, the gramophone companies were bent on using every 
resource to crush radio broadcasting. As dramatic and futile as such a 
scheme might seem to the modern eye, the gramophone industry, 
obsessively preoccupied with the diminution of record sales, saw only 
logic in its plan of annihilation. 
The decline in record sales  
The gramophone companies felt animus towards the radio stations 
from the early days of broadcasting. The three principal manufacturers, 
the Gramophone Company Limited, the Parlophone Company Limited 
                                                     
2 Gramophone Co Ltd v Cawardine & Co [1934] 1 Ch 451. 
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and Columbia Gramophone Company (Australia) Limited sustained 
heavy losses from 1926 until the opening the Royal Commission in 
1932. In 1931, the Gramophone Company and Columbia Gramophone 
Company (including its subsidiary the Parlophone Company) merged in 
the United Kingdom to form Electric and Musical Industries Limited 
(EMI), creating an instant profit powerhouse. But consolidation did not 
help EMI’s Australian offshoots, the “associated record 
manufacturers”. Their managers continued to complain of revenue lost 
to broadcasting. 
According to the associated manufacturers, disastrous profit results in 
Australia could be attributed to one cause: broadcasters. Radio stations 
playing hit records morning and night were discouraging listeners from 
buying gramophones and gramophone records. The gramophone 
industry felt the problem of lost sales most acutely in Australia, said the 
manufacturers, because of mixed broadcasting. The new commercial 
broadcasters, playing the latest tunes to attract market share, drew  
an ever-growing audience of listeners who now declined to buy the 
latest records. 
Commercial failure in Australia galled EMI and its subsidiaries. 
Between 1911 and 1927, the profits of the Gramophone Company in 
Britain rose nearly fivefold and in the 1920s dividend returns increased 
fourfold to the amazing figure of 60 per cent.3 The Columbia 
Gramophone Company regularly declared exceptional annual profit 
increases4 and paid dividends of 45 per cent in 1929.5  
In 1932, EMI declared issued capital of £6,265,749 but it could take no 
pleasure in the financial performance of its Australian offshoots. 
Capital and labour costs alone were cause for concern. In 1925, the 
Gramophone Company opened a factory in Erskineville in Sydney, and 
in 1926 the Columbia Gramophone Company one in Homebush, and 
in the years before the Royal Commission, the associated 
manufacturers employed over 500 people.6 
                                                     
3 Profits rose to the majestic figure of £760,000. Dividends in 1923 offered a 15 per 
cent return. In 1929, the return rose to 60 per cent. 
4 For example, in 1923–1926, profits increased from £56,000 to £150,000. 
5 The beginning of the Great Depression did not interrupt the march of profits. 
Dividends in 1930 were 40 per cent. 
6 The factories were built at a combined cost of £300,000. In the period 1925 and 
1931, the associated manufacturers employed up to 550 people and paid about 
£500,000 in wages and salaries. 
 
 
175 
 The associated manufacturers could validly argue that competition did 
not explain declining sales. In 1932, the only local record companies 
competing to sell records in the Australian market were Moulded 
Products Limited of Melbourne (a subsidiary of Decca Records), the 
Klippel Company of Sydney and the Brunswick Company. The first 
manufactured records as a secondary part of its business and in 1933 
lost its factory to fire, the second went into liquidation and the third 
ceased production. 
The complaint against broadcasters seemed persuasive. Not only did 
the radio stations seem to satisfy popular demand for music, they also 
broadcast so often that listeners, so the record companies said, grew 
sick of hearing the same song and would not purchase records. 
Although the associated manufacturers ruled the field, they could point, 
as proof of their argument, to an 80 per cent fall in sales between 1927 
and 1931. 
EMI and the war against radio 
EMI would not countenance such a decline in sales. Something had to 
be done, even allowing for the inevitably negative effect of the 
economic depression on record purchases. The merger of the 
Gramophone Company and Columbia Gramophone took place in 
March 1931, and, over the next few months, senior management 
worked out a course of action for the associated manufacturers in 
Australia. On 17 November 1931, the record companies issued to all 
broadcasting stations in Australia and New Zealand a written notice 
forbidding the use of their records for broadcasting. 
The ban came as a surprise, causing the radio stations immediate 
difficulty. They depended on supplies of records from the record 
companies and now found themselves deprived of the latest record 
releases, the lifeblood of much popular broadcasting by the commercial 
stations. The record companies manufactured under letters patent held 
by Columbia Gramophone (Australia) Limited granted and relied on a 
provision in the Patents Act 1903 that allowed them to impose 
conditions on the use of products manufactured under patent. 
When the radio ban came into effect in November 1931, the 
broadcasters immediately entered into negotiations. The B Class 
commercial stations, the majority of which operated on restricted 
budgets and could not hope to attract large audiences, and therefore 
advertisers, without access to new music releases, were especially 
 
176 
alarmed. They were now forced to play music from their back-
catalogues and to rely on importing records from the United States and 
Britain to obtain access to the latest releases. Importing music, 
however, did not solve their difficulties, since duties made imports 
prohibitively expensive, and the manufacturers used the import 
provisions of the Copyright Act to prevent radio stations from 
importing records manufactured by EMI in Britain. 
In September 1932, the manufacturers reached an agreement with the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission that permitted the ABC to 
broadcast records for six months,7 subject to requirements about 
playtime frequency and the announcing of record titles and other 
details. Negotiations with the commercial stations, represented by the 
Australian Federation of Broadcasting Stations, were much more 
difficult, and conducted, as the Royal Commission reported, “in a far 
from friendly spirit”.8  
The record companies blamed the B Class stations for their 
predicament, and though both parties accepted a draft agreement in 
August 1932, in October, the associated manufacturers withdrew from 
negotiations. They declared themselves willing to enter into agreements 
with certain country stations but refused to reach any settlement with 
the metropolitan broadcasters. 
The record companies’ demands were onerous. They required the B 
Class stations to discontinue request items, announce the maker of the 
record and full particulars of the record, state that copyright was 
reserved, broadcast only records of the associated manufacturers, limit 
the number of times a record was broadcast, limit broadcasts of records 
issued prior to the ban to once a week, and pay a broadcast fee. 
Detailed announcements about the provenance and legal status of 
records could be expected to annoy most music listeners, and whether 
the details would encourage those listeners to purchase records was 
doubtful. However, the commercial stations were desperate for new 
music, and as the Royal Commission reported, the Federation of 
                                                     
7 The parties continued to observe the terms of the agreement, even after it 
formally lapsed. 
8 The Royal Commission Report noted, mysteriously, that after a “representative of 
the Manufacturers left Australia,” relations between the parties “became more 
cordial”. Transcripts of Commission proceedings disclose the identity of the 
offending person – John Ritchie, General Manager of the Gramophone Company 
in Australia. EMI may have instructed him to implement the radio ban aggressively 
and recalled him when his presence became counterproductive. 
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Broadcasting Stations, “showed a willingness to co-operate as far as 
possible with the Manufacturers in maintaining the success of the 
latter’s trade.” They were willing to accept most of the terms laid down 
by record companies. But they could not accept the broadcast fee, or, 
more specifically, the performing right fee. 
The claim for mechanical performing right 
The record companies had two motives for asserting the mechanical 
performing right. First, they needed to establish a legal basis for 
imposing the broadcasting ban. As legal justification, they claimed a 
right under the patents legislation to impose any condition on the use 
of their records. This right, they said, allowed them to ban broadcasters 
from using their records and could encompass a performing right. 
More specifically, they argued, section 19 of the British Copyright Act 
(incorporated in the Australian legislation), supplied two performing 
rights, one in the author or composer or their assignee, and one in the 
record manufacturer. The manufacturer’s copyright in a record 
included the performing right in the record. 
The associated manufacturers also claimed the performing right for 
pecuniary reasons. They saw the great revenues collected by the 
Performing Right Society in the United Kingdom, and APRA in 
Australia and New Zealand, and realised that fees levied on 
performances of a recording could possibly deliver similar returns. 
Thus a mercenary motivation soon reinforced the primary reason for 
the radio ban. The gramophone companies knew that the imposition of 
a performance fee would not help them to solve the problem of 
declining record sales. But the idea of reversing revenue deficits by 
taxing broadcasters perhaps seemed irresistible. 
The claim for performance fees relied on assumptions radically 
different from those previously espoused by the recording industry. 
When William Harrison Moore met representatives of British 
gramophone companies prior to the Rome Conference, they agreed 
with him that the existence of a mechanical performing right could not 
be adduced from the language of section 19. They were mainly 
interested in claiming the right, they admitted, to ensure that the owner 
of musical copyright could not levy a performance fee on the individual 
purchaser of a record.  
In 1928, the recording industry seemed far from definite about how it 
would enforce a performing right in records. By 1932, doubts had 
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disappeared. The proposed right promised lucrative collections from 
broadcasters into the indefinite future, and, as the Royal Commission 
discovered, the associated record manufacturers were not going to 
lightly surrender the prospect of securing a legislative amendment that 
promised to deliver possibly vast secondary income. 
The quest for legal recognition of a mechanical performing right, 
seemingly masterminded at EMI’s headquarters in London, horrified 
commercial broadcasters. Their economic position remained parlous 
throughout the 1930s. Few could comfortably budget to pay 
performing right fees to both APRA and the associated manufacturers. 
None could feel confident that either APRA or the record companies 
would agree to discounts that took account of the straitened times. 
When the Royal Commission opened its investigation of the 
performing right in September 1932, the radio stations viewed the 
approaching proceedings with alarm.  
APRA’s offer to the ABC 
The Australian Broadcasting Commission took control of the National 
Broadcasting, or A Class, Stations on 1 July 1932. The object of the 
legislation establishing the ABC was to establish the conditions for 
national broadcasting for the public benefit.9 From the start of its 
operations, the ABC relied, as APRA knew, on access to the 
Association’s repertoire. In June 1932, APRA offered the national 
broadcaster a licence at rates much higher than those paid by the 
Australian Broadcasting Company, the previous controller of the A 
Class stations.10 The collecting society flatly refused the ABC’s counter-
offer of 5 per cent of annual revenue, and negotiations ground to a halt. 
The ABC could not afford to accept APRA’s offer – if the APRA 
formula were applied, the ABC would be liable to pay public 
performance fees totalling about 13 per cent of annual revenue. 
A comparison with the fees paid to the PRS by the BBC suggests that 
mutterings within the ABC of profiteering were justified. The BBC paid 
(on a basis of over 4.5 million licences) about £63,500 per annum for 
                                                     
9 The Australian Broadcasting Commission Act 1932. 
10 The Australian Broadcasting Company paid APRA fees calculated as a 
proportion of monies received for listeners’ licences and equalling the equivalent of 
2s per item of music performed up to 250,000 listeners’ licences, 1s 6d on the next 
50,000 and 1s per item on all listeners’ licences over 300,000. APRA proposed to 
charge the new ABC 2s 4.5d per item per main station attracting up to 350,000 
licensed listeners, and ¾d per item for each additional 10,000 listeners. 
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the whole repertoire of the Performing Right Society. If the BBC paid 
the rates proposed by APRA, it would remit an annual licence fee of 
£169,877. According to data collected by the Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights, APRA’s proposed formula, applied in other 
countries, would have increased annual licence fees paid in Germany by 
over 250 per cent, in Austria by nearly 300 per cent, in Poland by about 
250 per cent and in the United States by 400 per cent.11 
In support of its fees proposal, the ABC pointed out that no other 
country paid performance fees on a per item basis. It also objected that 
no other country had adopted a system of paying fees that increased as 
the number of listeners’ licences increased. But APRA refused to budge 
and when the Royal Commissioned opened in September 1932, neither 
side seemed ready to consider compromise. Eventually, in 1934, they 
agreed a formula much closer to the ABC’s proposal. APRA only 
changed its approach after the report of the Royal Commission on 
Performing Rights criticised it for greed.  
APRA and the commercial broadcasters 
In 1930, the B Class stations formed the Australian Federation of 
Broadcasting Stations to advocate public policy on their behalf and 
enable them to better deal with the demands of APRA. At this stage, 
APRA had successfully sued one Victorian station for broadcasting 
copyright music without authorisation and obtained injunctions against 
stations in Adelaide and Sydney preventing broadcasts of music. It had 
commenced or threatened litigation against various other broadcasters. 
Up to the end of 1930, the commercial broadcasters collectively paid 
APRA annual public performance licence fees totalling over £3000. At 
the beginning of 1931, the Association increased its charges to £8000 
per annum, and then, after negotiations with AFBS failed, reduced the 
annual charge to £6642 (exactly double the amount previously paid by 
the stations). Stations were charged at rates varying from ½d to 3d per 
item of music played, depending on the station’s audience size. APRA 
determined the total number of items played by reference to regular 
returns filed by the stations. 
                                                     
11 The Union Internationale de Radio Diffusion, Geneva, in the 1930s the leading 
authority on international broadcasting, supplied the data used by the Royal 
Commission to make these projections. 
 
180 
The position remained unchanged during the Royal Commission 
hearings, when B Class stations advised the Royal Commissioner they 
could not afford any increase to rates. In 1932, the most successful 
station earned a profit of £3229, while of the 30 stations, 16 incurred 
losses.12 Radio broadcasting involved considerable continuing 
investment in new equipment (and substantial depreciation losses) and 
heavy expenses, including the non-recoverable cost of advertising. 
Radio advertising was yet to deliver the financial bonanza that accrued 
in later years and accordingly broadcasters struggled for survival. 
APRA argued that profit and loss statements gave a misleading picture 
of the stations’ financial strength. Newspapers held interests in four 
stations, music, radio and other business enterprises in another  
seven, religious bodies in five, and political or semi-political 
organisations in another three. If stations could not meet their financial 
obligations, APRA suggested, their owners could certainly afford to pay 
the public performance fees. The radio stations demurred. APRA, they 
said, dealt with them as independent enterprises, and was not entitled 
to rely on assumptions about their shareholders’ finances when 
proposing fees. 
Significantly, in negotiations, APRA accepted arguments it would not 
have countenanced in discussions with the ABC. The commercial 
stations adamantly refused to pay fees calculated as a percentage of 
revenue. They argued that advertising expenses cancelled out a large 
portion of advertising revenue and they could not possibly afford to 
pay an arbitrary sum drawn from gross revenue. Charges made on a per 
item basis were essential if they were to manage budgets to pay the 
performance fee. 
APRA and the commercial broadcasters were willing in one respect to 
imitate the ABC payment model. The ABC paid fees to APRA out of 
public funds received from payments for listeners’ licences. APRA and 
AFBS, unable to reach agreement on fees in 1932, presented the Royal 
Commission on Performing Rights with three proposals for resolving 
their impasse, each involving public subsidy.  
The first was for the ABC to receive a larger allocation of fund from 
revenue received from listeners’ licence fees. The ABC could then pay a 
higher rate to APRA, allowing the Association to accept a much lower 
rate from the commercial stations. The second required the 
                                                     
12 Some of the profitable stations assisted the smaller stations to pay performance 
fees.  
 
181 
Government to allocate a portion of listeners’ fee revenue to the 
commercial stations to enable them to pay a higher rate to APRA. The 
third involved the Government advancing funds to the B Class stations 
to pay APRA charges, and the stations then adding the sum advanced 
to payments to government of each station’s licence fees.  
The Royal Commission and the Government rejected all three 
proposals out of hand. 
Cinema exhibitors and municipal associations 
Exhibitors 
For APRA, the cinemas were a key licensing target. By the beginning of 
the 1930s, they supplied APRA with the second highest portion of its 
annual takings, although the amount they paid still amounted to less 
than half that paid by A Class radio stations.13 When Latham returned 
to the copyright scene, he found that internal division complicated the 
negotiation position of cinema owners. Many detested the strategy of 
their national association which, after accepting an unpopular licensing 
agreement in 1926, aroused members’ fury by renewing the accord in 
1928 on terms considered grossly unfair.  
The new agreement renewed fee formulas that applied to the 
performance of orchestral music even though orchestras were 
disappearing from movie theatres.14 Additionally, cinema owners 
groaned under the burden meeting APRA’s licensing requirements. By 
1932, they were compelled to supply regular lists of music performed in 
the soundtracks of movies, with details of titles authors and 
composers.15 They also paid film distributors a fee for incorporating 
sound recordings in films, a quasi public performance levy invented by 
the distributors.  
                                                     
13 In 1926, the Federated Picture Showmen’s Association agreed fees payable to 
APRA for the performance of music at movies shows. The rates agreed were at 
once attacked. Many of the Association’s members bitterly resented the terms of 
agreement and refused to be bound by it. The member associations of half the 
States of Australia supported them by criticising the national organisation for the 
agreement reached. 
14 Made redundant by the advent of the “talkies” – films with soundtracks. 
15 Exhibitors did not know, until they received films for exhibition, what portions 
of music were incorporated in films and they encountered much difficulty in 
supplying the details required by APRA. 
 
182 
In 1932, distressed by the exactions of APRA and distributors, and 
burdensome reporting requirements, cinema exhibitors united in asking 
the Government for radical relief – abolition of the performing right, at 
least insofar as it applied to them. They asked for what the 
Government could not give but the Royal Commissioner sympathised 
with them over their “great” difficulties. He considered that the 
situation of cinema owners provided an unambiguous example of how 
the performing right could be exercised oppressively. Only an 
independent arbitral panel, empowered to determine rates could, he 
declared, fix the problems faced by exhibitors.16  
Local government 
By 1932, not all of APRA’s main licensing targets were paying public 
performance fees. Municipal associations, in particular, adopted tactics 
opposite to those embraced by the cinema exhibitors’ national 
association. They refused to reach accords with APRA because they 
would not accept that APRA could legitimately performing right fees. 
They questioned how a commercial right could apply to public, or non-
profit, activities.  
Thus, when Latham resumed his duties as Attorney General, he found 
that APRA’s longest running in-principle dispute – that with Australia’s 
local government organisations (and other owners of entertainment 
venues) – remained unresolved. The municipal associations, especially 
the Local Government Association of NSW, remained the most 
vociferous and outspoken of APRA’s opponents, a fly in the ointment 
in the 1930s.  
For APRA, their intransigence proved not only annoying but 
economically vexatious. Although hall owners’ contributions to 
APRA’s coffers were dwarfed by those of the national radio stations 
and the cinema owners, APRA knew that if they could not be made to 
pay fees, the size of their contribution would greatly augment revenue. 
                                                     
16 The Royal Commission report listed the problems of exhibitors: they found great 
difficulty in cataloguing items of music played in films, they had no readily available 
means of determining the copyright status of those items, and they could neither 
refuse to pay performance fees nor ascertain the criteria on which they were based. 
The solution, said the report, was a tribunal to determine licence fees and the terms 
of use. APRA should be compelled to file lists of charges which could be reviewed, 
when necessary, by the Minister. 
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Local government and the various hall owners proclaimed to Latham, 
and then the Royal Commission, that the use of their halls encouraged 
the public consumption of gramophone records and sheet music. Very 
often, they did not charge for the use of, or access to, a hall. Non-
commercial venues should pay no more than nominal fees. The hall 
owners fought determinedly. By 1933, only 20 municipal and shire halls 
throughout Australia were licensed by APRA to play music. 
Decision to hold Royal Commission 
Political considerations 
When John Latham resumed his duties as the nation’s first law officer, 
he hoped to develop his interest in international relations. Minister  
also for External Affairs and Industry, his portfolio responsibilities 
were vast and at first he seemed likely to concentrate on questions of 
trade and international cooperation. In 1932, he helped to secure the 
agreement of Britain and Canada to the principle of imperial trade 
preference, and in the same year attended disarmament and reparations 
conferences in Switzerland. But despite his workload, and his wish  
to play the role of a statesman, he did not back away from the 
copyright question.  
He could not afford to do so, for the arguments over public 
performance payments were hardly abated after 1925. After two years 
of severe economic depression, the disputing parties were grimly 
pessimistic. The national radio stations groaned under the burden of 
paying by far the highest performance fees, their commercial cousins 
insisted they could not afford any increase to rates, the local 
government associations refused to pay charges and the cinema owners 
claimed unfair treatment. Anger at new demands from APRA for fee 
increases began to harden into enmity. 
Latham knew he needed to tread warily. APRA’s position was, under 
the copyright legislation, legally unassailable. But the absence of any 
legal device for limiting the fees claimed by the Association could, he 
knew, be a source of public resentment against the Government. 
Battered by the times, the Australian public was in no mood to tolerate 
extravagant claims for licence fees that, if paid, might compromise the 
economic viability of some providers of public entertainment. 
Radio listeners devoted to hearing broadcast music might not forgive 
Latham if he allowed APRA to insist on commercial settlements that 
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drove some stations out of business, and interrupted the soothing 
rhythms of music on the airwaves. At the same time, Latham did not 
wish to offend APRA, or the powerful worldwide community of 
performing right societies. Fiercely asserting its rights, supported by an 
international network, and manifesting unnerving moral certitude, 
APRA marched confidently across the political landscape, a commercial 
behemoth not to be trifled with.  
Its actions placed Latham in a difficult position. By far the greatest 
proportion of APRA’s revenue came from payments from A Class 
radio stations and the collecting society had already signalled its intent 
to substantially increase the annual fee that the new government-owned 
ABC would be liable to pay – out of public funds – from July 1932. In 
the previous year, it doubled the charges payable by the commercial 
broadcasters, forcing smaller stations to call on larger ones for financial 
assistance to pay licence fees.  
Latham needed to make peace between APRA and the broadcasters, 
and indeed APRA and any other group of commercial music users, as 
soon as possible. In 1929, emboldened by Harrison Moore’s success at 
the Rome Conference in 1928, he seemed intent on putting forward 
legislation to introduce the compulsory arbitration of disputes over 
public performance licence fees. Then his party coalition lost office and 
legislative plans fell by the wayside. 
Importance of broadcasters  
In 1932, Latham had the benefit of reviewing alternative approaches  
to copyright reform. In the first half of 1932, he, the Postmaster 
General James Fenton, and their departmental officers considered 
options for reform. Developments in international copyright law 
supported an interventionist policy. The treaty amendments secured by 
Moore and Raymond at the Rome Conference protected the 
Government from the criticism that official inquiry into the performing 
right of itself invaded the broadcasting rights of copyright owners. The 
amended Berne Convention provided that copyright owners controlled 
the broadcasting of copyright works but the Convention also allowed 
for restriction of the right. It compelled governments to preserve the 
owner’s moral rights and the right to equitable remuneration, but 
otherwise permitted them to legislate to qualify the exercise of the right 
– so far as it affected broadcasters.  
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For Latham and, in particular, Fenton, the healthy development of the 
radio industry, and therefore the needs of radio broadcasters, were 
paramount concerns. In considering the way forward, they thus paid 
close attention to any means that would allow APRA and its opponents 
to agree “equitable remuneration”. At the same time, Latham hoped to 
broaden the scope of an inquiry into the performing right, as it affected 
broadcasters, to include inquiry into the grievances of all the 
commercial music users who continued to pepper him with their 
complaints. While Article 11 of the Berne Convention granted authors 
of musical works the right to authorise the public performance of their 
works, it did not specifically disallow governments from legislative – or 
other – intervention that affected the way in which owners determined 
performance fees. 
As long ago as June 1927, Latham’s parliamentary colleague Henry 
Gregory (who wrote also to the Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce) 
suggested to him a Royal Commission to investigate the twin questions 
of the performing right and claims for licence fees by APRA. Then, 
early in 1932, G L Chilvers, the Secretary of the Australian Federation 
of Broadcasting Stations, sent letters to Canberra that again raised the 
question of a public inquiry. Chilvers’ description of the collapse of 
licensing negotiations between APRA and the Federation reinforced 
Latham’s long-held view that legislative action might be necessary to 
regulate APRA’s activities.17  
Anger in Parliament 
Political reaction to the bill establishing the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission hastened Government action. Fenton introduced the bill 
in March, and to the Government’s surprise, the legislation produced 
an outpouring of anger in Parliament against APRA. APRA, said MPs, 
was “perpetrating a big bluff on the public of Australia” and “robbing 
promoters of entertainments, owners of halls etc.” The bill should be 
amended to “protect the general public from exploitation by … 
commercial pirates”.  
                                                     
17 In comments made during the hearings of the Royal Commission on Performing 
Rights, the Royal Commissioner, Justice Owen, said that Chilvers’ letters played a 
significant role in persuading Latham to seek the appointment of the Royal 
Commission. In correspondence to the Secretary of the Commission in November 
1932, Chilvers said he understood that his letters were “an important factor” in the 
Government’s decision to commission the investigation of performing rights. 
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When the ABC bill passed in May, Latham was in Geneva attending the 
League of Nations’ disarmament conference. During his absence, a 
bipartisan deputation from both Houses asked Alexander McLachlan, 
the Acting Attorney General, to institute a public inquiry into the 
performing right, particularly payments made by broadcasters to 
APRA. In June, on McLachlan’s recommendation, the Government 
promised to hold an inquiry. On his return to Canberra, Latham 
immediately set his department to work on the terms of reference. On 
31 August 1932, he rose in the House of Representatives to announce 
the Royal Commission into Performing Rights. The Commissioner was 
to report on the operation of the performing right, rates and conditions 
of payment of performing right fees and methods of collecting.18  
Latham explained to the House that Australia’s obligation to implement 
and observe the provisions of the Berne Convention limited the scope 
of action that the Commission could propose. The owner of musical 
works possessed the sole right to authorise public performances of the 
work by live shows, radio broadcasting, film exhibitions and the playing 
of gramophone records. Nothing the Commission might recommend 
would undermine the owner’s exclusive right to authorise public 
performances and receive payment for the performances. 
On the other hand, the Berne Convention did not prevent the 
Government from investigating the terms, including rates of payment, 
on which owners licensed users to perform copyright works in public. 
Latham indicated that he expected the Commission to concentrate on 
establishing a formula for valuing the performing right. “The 
Government,” he said, “considers that a composer or his assignee is 
entitled to a reasonable reward for his creative effort. It is difficult to 
state what would be a reasonable reward in varying circumstances.”  
The difficult task of working out ways for determining reasonable 
reward now fell to an independent body. Latham breathed a sigh of 
relief and turned his attention to the regulation of financial relations 
                                                     
18 The original terms of reference (the terms of reference were extended in 
November 1932 to include inquiry into issues arising between the owners and users 
of records) required the Commissioner to inquire and report upon –  
(a) any questions that have arisen or may arise between persons interested in performing rights in 
copyright works and persons interested or concerned in the performance of such works whether as 
performers or as persons authorizing or controlling the performance, or as persons on whose 
premises the work is performed, or otherwise; and 
(b) the rates, methods and conditions of payment to the owners of the copyright in musical and 
other works by the persons aforesaid for the right to perform such works in public. 
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between the Commonwealth and States and crimes legislation. His 
ambitions already lay in the direction of the High Court bench and 
though his interest in copyright matters did not flag, his part in the 
drama of the performing right became increasingly passive. 
While the broadcasters were chiefly responsible for the decision to 
commission an inquiry, and the other commercial users of copyright 
music welcomed the Government’s intervention, APRA could claim at 
least one declared supporter. On 1 June 1932, Melbourne’s Age 
newspaper devoted three columns to explaining why critics of APRA 
were mistaken. The paper censured commercial broadcasters. 
“Wireless” had “robbed the composer of a large source of income”. A 
public inquiry into the fees charged by APRA would be “enlightening” 
to the public, which “has no desire to enjoy the product of a man’s 
brain without paying for its enjoyment”. 
The Age concluded that while “some adjustment” of APRA’s fees 
might be found to be necessary, “in regard to its right to charge fees on 
behalf of the owners of copyright there can be no question whatever in 
the opinion of fair-minded men.”  
 
